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Abstract—We consider a bi-level lottery where a social planner
at the high level selects a reward first and, sequentially, a set
of players at the low level jointly determine a Nash equilibrium
given the reward. The social planner is faced with efficiency losses
where a Nash equilibrium of the lottery game may not coincide
with the social optimum. We propose an optimal bi-level lottery
design problem as finding least reward and perturbations such
that the induced Nash equilibrium produces the socially optimal
payoff. We formally characterize the price of anarchy as well as
the behavior of public goods and Nash equilibrium with respect
to the reward and perturbations. We relax the optimal bi-level
lottery design problem via a convex approximation and identify
mild sufficient conditions under which the approximation is exact.
A case study on demand response in the smart grid is conducted
to demonstrate the results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced information and communications technologies
have been stimulating rapid emergence of multi-agent sys-
tems where a large number of spatially distributed agents
interact with each other to accomplish complex missions.
Substantial effort has been spent on analysis, design and
control of multi-agent systems [7], [11], [39], [47], [60]. In
many practical scenarios, agents are non-cooperative and seek
for heterogeneous (or even conflicting) subobjectives. This
leads to competitions over limited resources and degradation
of system-wide performance. To address the issue, common
practices include mechanism design or incentive design which
modify agents’ preferences via side payment or pricing so that
individual interests are aligned with social welfare. Mechanism
design has been studied when the designer has complete and
incomplete information on agents’ types [53]. There are sev-
eral classes of mechanism design with incomplete information.
An auction consists of multiple bidders who submit bids
according to their valuations of items being auctioned, and
an auctioneer who sequentially determines item allocation and
pricing. The most well-known auction mechanism is Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction [13], [21], [59] which has been
shown to be efficient and incentive compatible [20], [23].
Contract theory [8] studies how the principal constructs a
contract in the presence of asymmetric information of the
agent(s). There are three major models; i.e., moral hazard [52]
(the agents have hidden information after the contract), adverse
selection [5] (the agents have hidden information before the
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contract), and signaling [54] (some confidential information is
provided by the agents). Mechanisms have been applied to a
variety of areas, including smart grid [35], communication net-
works [24], [26], and transportation networks [38]. Moreover,
mechanism design has been extended to dynamic scenarios
where agents are incentivized to follow specified algorithms
and solve computation or control problems [43], [45], [56].
In mechanism design with complete information, the de-
signer does not experience a lack of knowledge of agents’
types. Therefore, the designer is able to deduce the agents’
responses to its policy choice. This class includes optimal
taxation [40], game design [2], [36], incentive control [6],
[22], and lottery [41]. In optimal taxation, agents maximize
their own utility functions by choosing labor time and con-
sumption, and the designer chooses the optimal tax function
to maximize the overall utility. In game design, it is the
designer that chooses the utility functions of agents to achieve
specific control objectives and the agents maximize their utility
functions. Incentive control is an incentive design in a dynamic
environment where agents’ control choices are influenced by
rewards or prices such that a social welfare can be optimized.
As one kind of mechanism design with complete informa-
tion, fixed prize lotteries have been applied to several field
experiments and proven to be effective to stimulate agents’
or players’ investments. INSINC project in Singapore [46] is
an ongoing real-world implementation of a lottery scheme for
commuters, who use public transportation, to travel off peak
hours. The lottery scheme successfully reduces around 7.5%
of peak time demand. A similar project named INSTANT [38]
is conducted in India and results in more than 20% of
commuter shifts. Research [3] uses the boarding passes of
local public transportation as lottery tickets, showing that the
lottery increases the provision of public goods and reduces free
riders. In [30], [49], [55], experiments are conducted to show
that lottery based incentives can effectively increase survey
response rates. Moreover, lottery based incentives have been
used in demand response in the smart grid [32], [51], mobile
crowd sensing for traffic congestion and air pollution [16] and
Internet congestion [34].
Substantial effort has been exerted to develop fundamental
theory of lotteries. Seminal paper [41] studies that fixed prize
lotteries alleviate the free-rider problem, and nudge higher
levels of public good provisions as well as aggregate payoff
than voluntary contributions. A larger reward results in a
greater public good and aggregate payoff. The results have
been extended by many researchers. In [31], a multi-prize
lottery is studied with considering risk preferences; i.e., risk
neutral versus risk averse. A sequential lottery is investigated
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2in [15] in which it can sell more tickets than one-level lottery.
Paper [44] conducts public good analysis on player size, and
extends the results to a rival public good case; i.e., each player
gets benefits from a portion of public goods.
Contributions. In current lottery schemes, the competition
among the players induces efficiency losses; i.e., a Nash
equilibrium of a lottery game may not coincide with its
social optimum. The social optimum is only achieved when
an infinite reward is given [41]. To address the issue, we
introduce perturbation parameter chosen by the social planner,
and formulate an optimal bi-level lottery design problem where
a Nash equilibrium of a lottery game induces a socially
optimal payoff with least reward and perturbations. On top
of this, we impose general convex inequality constraints to
encompass physical constraints and social planner’s interest.
We analyze the properties of low-level Nash equilibrium,
including the price of anarchy as well as the behavior of public
goods and Nash equilibrium with respect to the reward and
perturbations. By leveraging the above analytical results, we
derive a convex approximation of the optimal bi-level lottery
design problem and identify mild sufficient conditions under
which the approximation is exact. Our results are verified via
a case study on demand response in the smart grid.
This paper is enriched from preliminary version [27], and
includes a set of new results. In particular, this paper derives
new properties of Nash equilibrium and public goods as well
as more practical bounds on price of anarchy. Additionally,
this paper introduces a convex approximation of the optimal
lottery design problem and show that there is no approximation
error. Further, a case study on demand response is provided
to demonstrate the developed results.
Paper organization. In Section II, we discuss a classic
bi-level lottery scheme and its limitations. To alleviate the
fundamental limitation of efficiency losses, we introduce a new
perturbed bi-level lottery model and formulate the optimal bi-
level lottery design problem in Section III. In Section IV, we
analyze properties of low-level Nash equilibrium. Based on the
properties, we relax the optimal bi-level lottery design problem
as a convex optimization problem in Section V. Lastly, we
conduct a case study on demand response in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We introduce a classic bi-level lottery scheme in [41] and
outline its procedure in Section II-A to II-C. Section II-D
discusses its limitations and motivates our problem. Please
refer to [41] for comprehensive discussions on the classic
lottery scheme.
A. Payoff model
Consider a social planner who holds a lottery and a set
of players V , {1, 2, · · · , N} who participate in the lottery.
Before holding the lottery, the social planner announces a
public good to be financed by the net profit of the lottery.
The public good provision consists of the net profit of the
lottery and benefits all the players but the amount of benefits
may be different. Each player chooses a benefit function
corresponding to the announced public good. Then, the social
planner chooses a reward R from an action set R = (0,∞).
Given reward R, each player i invests si to the lottery from
an action set Si = [0, wi], and receives a portion of the
reward R proportional to its own investment over the total
investment, and also gets benefits from the public good, where
wi denotes the amount of investable wealth of player i. The
action profile s , {si}i∈V ∈ S can be expressed as {si, s−i}
where s−i denotes the action profile other than player i;
i.e., s−i , {sj}j∈V\{i}. Given reward R, payoff function
ui : S → R associated with player i is described by:
ui(s,R) ,
{
si
s¯ R+ hi(s¯−R)− si, for s¯ ≥ R
0, otherwise
(1)
where s¯ ,
∑
i∈V si. Payoff function (1) indicates that the
lottery holds only when total investment s¯ exceeds or equals
to reward R; otherwise, the social planner cancels the lottery
and returns the investments to the players. The first term sis¯ R
represents the portion of reward from the lottery and the rate
si
s¯ can be seen as the probability of winning if the reward is
given by a raffle, and the players are risk-neutral; i.e., they
consider the expected reward sis¯ R as the utility. The last term−si denotes the cost of player i. Function hi : R≥0 → R≥0
represents any benefit obtained from the pre-announced public
good and is a function of net profit s¯ − R. It can be also
interpreted as the agent’s private valuation functions on excess
utility, which stimulates the agent’s investment. The function is
called marginal benefit function because, besides the benefits
from reward R, it represents any additional utility received.
In the classic lottery, there are two important assumptions.
The first one is that players experience diminishing marginal
utility from the provision of the public good, which is a classic
assumption in social economics [57], [17]. The other assump-
tion is that the public good is socially desirable; i.e., financing
non-zero public good increases network-wide payoffs. The
formalization of the above assumptions is as follows:
Assumption 2.1: The function hi is twice differentiable,
strictly increasing, strictly concave, hi(0) = 0,
∑
i∈V
∂hi(0)
∂G >
1, and limG→∞
∂hi(G)
∂G = 0.
In applications, hi has been seen as any side benefit which is
generated by the net-profit (or social benefits). For instance, in
demand response, hi denotes the level of (inverse) harzard [32]
and any side payment from the net-profit [51]. In internet
congestion, hi(·) = −L(·) where L(·) is a disutility due to
congestion [33].
B. Low-level decision making - Nash equilibrium
Given R and s−i, player i chooses si to maximize its own
payoff as follows:
max
si∈Si
ui(s,R).
The collection of local optimization problems induces a non-
cooperative game among the players and the game is param-
eterized by R. Nash equilibrium [42] defines the solution of
the game.
Definition 2.1: Given R, the action profile s∗(R) is a (pure)
Nash equilibrium if ui(s′i, s
∗
−i(R), R) ≤ ui(s∗(R), R) for
∀s′i ∈ Si,∀i ∈ V .
3Note that Nash equilibrium s∗(R) highlights its dependency
on reward R.
C. High-level decision making - Social optimum
The lottery is a bi-level decision making (or a hierarchical
optimization) problem where the social planner at the high
level selects reward first and, sequentially, the players at
the low level jointly determine a Nash equilibrium given
the reward. The social planner aims to choose reward R to
maximize the aggregate payoff of the players at the induced
Nash equilibrium:
max
R∈R
∑
i∈V
ui(s
∗(R), R)
s.t. g(s∗(R), R) ≤ 0
=
max
R∈R
∑
i∈V
hi(G(R))−G(R)
s.t. g(s∗(R), R) ≤ 0
(2)
where G(R) , s¯∗(R) − R is referred to as the public good
which is obtained by transforming the net profit s¯∗(R) − R
into G(R), on a one-for-one basis. The hierarchical nature of
the problem requires the social planner to predict the low-level
Nash equilibrium when making decisions at the high level.
Inequality constraint g(s∗(R), R) ≤ 0 expresses physical
constraints and social planner’s interest (e.g., the amount of
required investments) as shown in Section VI where g : S ×
R → Rm is a vector of convex functions g`(s∗(R), R) for ` =
1, 2, · · · ,m. The convex inequality constraint g(s∗(R), R) ≤
0 is absent in the classic bi-level lottery in [41].
Assumption 2.2: Function g`(s∗, R) is convex with respect
to its arguments s∗ and R for ` = 1, 2, · · · ,m.
The lottery design is an incentive design where messages
are being exchanged between the social planner and agents.
The agents provide the marginal benefit function hi and then
the social planner provides (R, c).
D. Limitations
When g(s∗(R), R) ≤ 0 is absent, Assumption 2.1 ensures
that there exists a unique socially optimal public good (Propo-
sition 2.1 in [41])
G∗ = arg max
G∈[0,∞)
∑
i∈V
hi(G)−G,
where G∗ > 0 is the solution of∑
i∈V
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G
= 1 (3)
due to strict concaveness of hi. The socially optimal public
good maximizes the aggregate payoff, and we define the
aggregate payoff
∑
i∈V hi(G
∗) − G∗ as the socially optimal
payoff. However, the socially optimal public good (as well as
socially optimal payoff) is achieved only when R→∞ (The-
orem 2 in [41]). An infinite reward is apparently impractical.
Moreover, existing works do not consider convex inequality
constraint g(s∗(R), R) ≤ 0 in the bi-level lottery, although it
is essential in many engineering applications. This paper aims
to design a new incentive design to address the limitations.
III. OPTIMAL BI-LEVEL LOTTERY DESIGN
This section introduces a new practical scheme to achieve
the socially optimal payoff, and satisfy convex inequality con-
straints. In particular, a perturbed lottery model is introduced
in Section III-A and lower-level decision-making is presented
in Section III-B. A new problem for the social planner is
introduced in Section III-C. We highlight the differences from
those in Section II.
A. Perturbed payoff model
Consider the following perturbed payoff model for player i:
Ui(s,R, c) ,
{
si−ci
s¯−c¯ R+ hi(s¯−R)− si, for s¯ ≥ R
0, otherwise
(4)
where c , {ci}i∈V and c¯ ,
∑
i∈V ci, and ci is perturbation
parameter. In (4), (R, c) is chosen by the social planner from
a set R × C where C , C1 × · · · × CN , and Ci , [0,∞).
In the perturbed lottery, the social planner is able to choose
reward R and, at the same time, change the odds of winning
by perturbing the individual investments. In particular, pertur-
bation parameter ci introduces an offset to the odds of winning
but the aggregate portion remains one; i.e.,
∑
i∈V
si−ci
s¯−c¯ = 1.
The perturbation is announced along with reward R before
holding a lottery. The perturbed payoff model has been studied
in [10], [18]. In the papers, payoffs are functions of perturbed
investment si − ci where si is an effort made by player i,
and ci is an external perturbation. Likewise, perturbation c is
externally given by the social planner in the current paper, and
it perturbs the portions of the reward to be received by players.
The external perturbation can be interpreted as an intervention
of the social planner to achieve social optimum, and to satisfy
convex constraint g(s∗(R, c), R) ≤ 0.
B. Low-level decision making - Nash equilibrium
Given R, c, and s−i, player i chooses si to maximize its
own payoff: maxsi∈Si Ui(s,R, c), where Si , [0,∞). Nash
equilibrium s∗(R, c) is dependent on R and c. If the reward
term s
∗
i (R,c)−ci
s¯∗(R,c)−c¯ R is negative, player i is assumed to pay a fine
− s∗i (R,c)−cis¯∗(R,c)−c¯ R to the social planner.
C. High-level decision making - Social optimum
As problem (2), the social planner wants to maximize the
aggregate of perturbed payoffs as follows:
max
(R,c)∈R×C
∑
i∈V
Ui(s
∗(R, c), R, c)
s.t. g(s∗(R, c), R) ≤ 0
=
max
(R,c)∈R×C
∑
i∈V
hi(G(R, c))−G(R, c)
s.t. g(s∗(R, c), R) ≤ 0
(5)
where g : S × R → Rm remains identical to that in (2) and
the dependency of public good G(R, c) , s¯∗(R, c) − R on
R and c is emphasized. Since the objective function of (5)
is identical to that of (2), it is maximized when G(R, c) =
G∗ as well as constraint g(s∗(R, c), R) ≤ 0 is absent. There
could be multiple optimal solutions for problem (5). So the
4social planner aims to choose the optimal solution induced by
minimal reward and perturbation. Considering this case, we
formulate the following bi-level optimization problem:
min
(R,c)∈R×C
R+ αc¯
s.t.
(R, c) ∈ arg max∑
i∈V
Ui(s
∗(R, c), R, c)
s.t. g(s∗(R, c), R) ≤ 0
(6)
where constant α ≥ 0 represents a relative weight on the
perturbation c¯.
IV. ANALYSIS OF LOW-LEVEL NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we study the properties of Nash equi-
librium of problem (5) to solve problem (6). Theorem 4.1
summarizes important properties of the perturbed lottery at
Nash equilibrium. In particular, (P1) shows the existence and
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and (P2) demonstrates that
any (R, c) in the feasible set F(5) of problem (5) satisfies
s¯∗(R, c) − c¯ = G(R, c) + R − c¯ ≥ 0 if there exists (R, c)
such that G(R, c) = G∗. (P2) helps to reduce the feasible set
of interest.
Theorem 4.1: Suppose Assumption 2.1 holds. Consider any
pair (R, c) ∈ R × C. Then, the following properties hold at
Nash equilibrium.
(P1) Given any ci ≥ 0 for ∀i ∈ V and R > 0, there is a
unique Nash equilibrium s∗(R, c);
(P2) Given |V| 6= 1, any (R, c) such that G(R, c) = G∗
satisfies c¯ ≤ G(R, c) +R.
Proof: In the proof, we will drop the dependency of G,
s∗, Ui, and Va on R and c.
We first introduce the first order condition which must be
satisfied at a Nash equilibrium:
∂Ui(s
∗, R, c)
∂si
= R
s¯∗ − c¯− (s∗i − ci)
(s¯∗ − c¯)2 +
∂hi(s¯
∗ −R)
∂G
− 1 ≤ 0 (7)
for ∀i ∈ V . If player i is active; i.e., s∗i > 0, then equality
holds. To prove the first order condition by contradiction,
assume that ∂Ui(s
∗,R,c)
∂si
=  > 0. Then, by the Taylor series
expansion, there exists a constant δ > 0 such that
Ui(s
∗
i + δ, s
∗
−i, R, c) > Ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i, R, c) + δ.
This leads to a contradiction to the definition of Nash equilib-
rium. The remaining part can be proven in a similar way.
(P1) Since hi is strictly increasing and strictly concave, there
is ξL > 0 such that
∂hi(ξ)
∂G < 1 for all ξ ≥ ξL. Consider any R,
c and s−i. If si is sufficiently large, then Ui(s) < 0. So there is
Bi(R, c) > 0 such that s∗i (R, c) < Bi(R, c). Hence, s
∗(R, c)
is identical to the maximizer of the game: maxsi Ui(s) s.t.
si ∈ [0, Bi(R, c)]. In this problem, the payoff functions are
concave and the decision variables lie in compact sets. Hence,
s∗(R, c) exists. The remaining part can be proven by similar
arguments of Lemma 3 in [41].
(P2) We show by contradiction. Assume s¯∗− c¯ = G+R−
c¯ < 0 and G = G∗. The aggregate of the first order conditions
of active players is∑
i∈Va
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
=
R(|Va| − 1)
R+G− c¯ +
∑
i∈V\Va(s
∗
i − ci)
(R+G− c¯)2 R
+
∑
i∈Va
∂hi(G)
∂G
− |Va| = 0.
Since ∂hi(G)∂G > 0 and si = 0 for i ∈ V \ Va, we have
R(|Va| − 1)
R+G− c¯ −
∑
i∈V\Va ci
(R+G− c¯)2R+
∑
i∈V
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G
− |Va|
= − (G− c¯)(|Va| − 1)
R+G− c¯ −
∑
i∈V\Va ci
(R+G− c¯)2R ≥ 0 (8)
which never holds when |Va| 6= 1 because G−c¯ < R+G−c¯ <
0 and ci ≥ 0.
If |Va| = 1, then (8) holds when ci = 0 for ∀i ∈ V \ Va.
The first order condition of k ∈ Va is
∂Uk(s
∗)
∂sk
= R
s¯∗ − c¯− (s∗k − ck)
(s¯∗ − c¯)2 +
∂hk(s¯
∗ −R)
∂G
− 1
=
∂hk(s¯
∗ −R)
∂G
− 1 = 0
where ck = c¯ is applied. Thus,
∂hk(G
∗)
∂G = 1 and∑
i∈V
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G > 1. This contradicts the definition of G
∗.
If the convex constraint g(s∗(R, c), R) ≤ 0 is ab-
sent in problem (5), there always exists (R, c) such that
G(R, c) = G∗ and thus (P2) holds (which will be shown
later). In other words, if the optimal value of problem (5)
remains
∑
i∈V hi(G
∗)−G∗ with/without the convex constraint
g(s∗(R, c), R) ≤ 0, then (P2) holds.
According to (P2), we only focus on the feasible set with
the constraint c¯ ≤ G(R, c)+R in problem (5). This constraint
makes us to further derive the following properties while it
does not restrict the choice of (R, c). Theorem 4.2 summarizes
the derived properties, and these properties are essential to
solve bi-level optimization problem (6). Furthermore, the prop-
erties reduce to those of unperturbed lottery in Section II when
ci = 0. (P3) indicates that public good G(R, c) is bounded by
c¯ and G∗, and it is increasing in (R, c) when all the players
are active. (P4) shows that all the players are active if reward
R is greater than a certain threshold, and there exists a lower
bound of s∗i (R, c), which is a strictly increasing function in
R. Moreover, in some cases, s∗i (R, c) is strictly increasing in
(R, c). (P5) quantifies the price of anarchy [28] which is the
ratio between the socially optimal payoff and the aggregate
payoff induced by the corresponding Nash equilibrium. The
lower and upper bounds of the price of anarchy reveal possible
efficiency losses due to selfishness of players, and they can be
quantified without explicitly calculating Nash equilibrium.
The following notations are used in Theorem 4.2. Function
sgn(·) is a sign function. The value RL(c) is the unique
solution of RL(c)
RL(c)+GU−c¯ = maxi∈V{1 −
∂hi(G
U )
∂G }, where
GU , max{G∗, c¯}. Define player i who invests non-zero
wealth s∗i (R, c) > 0 as an active player and define Va(R, c) ,
{i ∈ V|s∗i (R, c) > 0} as the set of all the active players. Lastly,
5if c¯ ≤ G∗, then
G(R, c) , H−1( (|V¯a(R, c)| − 1)(G
L − c¯)
R+GU − c¯ + 1)
G¯(R, c) , H−1( (N − 1)(G
U − c¯)
R+GL − c¯ + 1)
otherwise
G¯(R, c) , H−1( (|V¯a(R, c)| − 1)(G
L − c¯)
R+GL − c¯ + 1)
G(R, c) , H−1( (N − 1)(G
U − c¯)
R+GU − c¯ + 1)
where GL , min{G∗, c¯}, H(G) , ∑i∈V ∂hi(G)dG and
V¯a(R, c) is the number of players who satisfy RR+GU−c¯ +
∂hi(G
U )
∂G − 1 > 0. Note that H : R≥0 → Y is invertible on
codomain Y , (0, H(0)] because H is a strictly decreasing
and continuous.
Theorem 4.2: Suppose Assumption 2.1 holds. Consider any
pair (R, c) ∈ R × C such that c¯ ≤ G(R, c) + R. Then, the
following properties hold at Nash equilibrium.
(P3) It holds that c¯ ≤ G(R, c) ≤ G∗ or G∗ ≤ G(R, c) ≤
c¯. If |Va(R, c)| = N , then sgn(G∗ − c¯)dG(R,c)dR ≥ 0,
and dG(R,c)dci > 0 where equality holds if and only if
c¯ = G∗;
(P4) If R > RL(c), then s∗i (R, c) ≥ ci + R
(
R
R+GU−c¯ +
∂hi(G
U )
∂G − 1
)
> 0 where the lower bound is strictly
increasing in R without bound. If |Va(R, c)| = N ,
there is some i ∈ V such that ds∗i (R,c)dR > 0.
(P5) Price of anarchy PoA(R, c) , maxs∈S
∑
i∈V Ui(s)∑
i∈V Ui(s∗(R,c),R,c)
is characterized by∑
i∈V hi(G
∗)−G∗∑
i∈V hi(G(R, c))−G(R, c)
≤ PoA(R, c)
≤
∑
i∈V hi(G
∗)−G∗∑
i∈V hi(G¯(R, c))− G¯(R, c)
.
If c¯ = 0, it holds that PoA > 1 for any R <∞ and
limR→∞ PoA(R, 0) = 1.
Proof: In the proof, we will drop the dependency of G,
G, G¯, s∗, Ui, Va, RL and PoA on R and c.
(P3) Assume G ≤ c¯. The aggregate of the first order
conditions (7) is∑
i∈V
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
=
R(N − 1)
R+G− c¯ +
∑
i∈V
∂hi(G)
∂G
−N ≤ 0 (9)
and thus we have∑
i∈V
∂hi(G)
∂G
≤ 1 =
∑
i∈V
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G
.
This implies G∗ ≤ G ≤ c¯ due to strict concaveness of hi.
Now assume G ≥ c¯. The aggregate of the first order
conditions (7) of active players:∑
i∈Va
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
=
R(|Va| − 1)
R+G− c¯ +
∑
i∈V\Va(s
∗
i − ci)
(R+G− c¯)2 R
+
∑
i∈Va
∂hi(G)
∂G
− |Va| = 0.
Note that s∗i = 0 for i ∈ V \Va. By the fact that hi is a strictly
increasing function, it becomes∑
i∈V
∂hi(G)
∂G
≥ −R(|Va| − 1)
R+G− c¯ + |Va|+
∑
i∈V\Va ci
(R+G− c¯)2R
=
(|Va| − 1)(G− c¯)
R+G− c¯ +
∑
i∈V\Va ci
(R+G− c¯)2R+ 1
=
(|Va| − 1)(G− c¯)
R+G− c¯ +
∑
i∈V\Va ci
(R+G− c¯)2R+
∑
i∈V
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G
.
(10)
Because (|Va|−1)(G−c¯)R+G−c¯ ≥ 0 and ci ≥ 0, (10) implies G ≤ G∗
by strict concaveness of hi. Thus, c¯ ≤ G ≤ G∗.
Now we consider the case with |Va| = N . Since all the
players are active the aggregate first order condition (9) holds
with equality where
∑
i∈V
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
can be regarded as an
implicit function of (s∗, R, c). We apply the implicit function
theorem (Theorem 1.3.1 in [29]) to (9)
−∂(
∑
i∈V
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
)
∂G
dG
dR
=
∂(
∑
i∈V
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
)
∂R
and obtain
dG
dR
= − (G− c¯)(N − 1)
(R+G− c¯)2∑i∈V ∂2hi(G)∂G2 −R(N − 1) . (11)
Thus, dGdR ≥ 0 if c¯ ≤ G ≤ G∗ and dGdR ≤ 0 if G∗ ≤ G ≤ c¯. It
holds that dGdR = 0 if and only if G = c¯.
We will show that G = c¯ if and only if c¯ = G∗. If c¯ = G∗,
then G = c¯ because c¯ ≤ G ≤ G∗. We now prove that if
G = c¯ then c¯ = G∗. Assume G = c¯, then aggregate first order
condition (9) yields∑
i∈V
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
=
∑
i∈V
∂hi(c¯)
∂G
− 1 = 0.
The unique solution is c¯ = G∗.
We proceed to prove dGdci > 0. By applying the implicit
function theorem to (9), we have
−∂(
∑
i∈V
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
)
∂G
dG
dci
=
∂(
∑
i∈V
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
)
∂ci
and obtain
dG
dci
= − R(N − 1)
(R+G− c¯)2∑i∈V ∂2hi(G)∂G2 −R(N − 1) > 0.
(12)
(P4) By G ≤ max{G∗, c¯} , GU and concaveness of hi,
first order condition (7) yields
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
= R
s¯∗ − c¯− (s∗i − ci)
(s¯∗ − c¯)2 +
∂hi(s¯
∗ −R)
∂G
− 1
≥ R
s¯∗ − c¯ −R
s∗i − ci
(s¯∗ − c¯)2 +
∂hi(G
U )
∂G
− 1. (13)
Assume s∗i < ci, then with R > RL,
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
>
RL
RL +GU − c¯ +
∂hi(G
U )
∂G
− 1 = 0.
This contradicts the first order condition, and thus s∗i ≥ ci.
6With GU ≥ c¯, (13) becomes
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
≥ R
R+GU − c¯ −
s∗i − ci
R
+
∂hi(G
U )
∂G
− 1.
If s∗i < ci + R
(
R
R+GU−c¯ +
∂hi(G
U )
∂G − 1
)
, then ∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
> 0,
a contradiction to the first order condition. Therefore s∗i ≥
ci+R
(
R
R+GU−c¯+
∂hi(G
U )
∂G −1
)
and the lower bound is strictly
positive, because R > RL.
We now proceed to prove that the bound Li(R, c) , ci +
R
(
R
R+GU−c¯ +
∂hi(G
U )
∂G −1
)
is a strictly increasing function of
R without bound. By taking derivative of the bound, we have
∂Li
∂R
=
R
R+GU − c¯ +
∂hi(G
U )
∂G
− 1 +R G
U − c¯
(R+GU − c¯)2
which is strictly greater than 0 since GU ≥ c¯ and R > RL.
Moreover, function Li keeps increasing without bound as R
increases because limR→∞ ∂Li∂R =
∂hi(G
U )
∂G > 0.
Now we will consider the case with |Va| = N . We will
show that there is at least one i such that ds
∗
i
dR > 0 holds.
Since all the players are active, the first order condition (7)
holds with equality ∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
= 0 where ∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
can be regarded
as an implicit function of (s∗, R, c). By the implicit function
theorem, relation
−

∂2U1(s
∗)
∂s21
· · · ∂2U1(s∗)∂s1∂sN
...
. . .
...
∂2UN (s
∗)
∂sN∂s1
· · · ∂2UN (s∗)
∂s2N


ds∗1
dR
...
ds∗N
dR
 =

∂2U1(s
∗)
∂s1∂R
...
∂2UN (s
∗)
∂sN∂R

holds where
∂2Ui(s
∗)
∂s2i
= −2Rs¯
∗ − c¯− (s∗i − ci)
(s¯∗ − c¯)3 +
∂2hi(s¯
∗ −R)
∂G2
< 0
∂2Ui(s
∗)
∂si∂sj
= −Rs¯
∗ − c¯− 2(s∗i − ci)
(s¯∗ − c¯)3 +
∂2hi(s¯
∗ −R)
∂G2
∂2Ui(s
∗)
∂si∂R
=
s¯∗ − c¯− (s∗i − ci)
(s¯∗ − c¯)2 −
∂2hi(s¯
∗ −R)
∂G2
> 0.
If we choose k = argmini∈V s
∗
i , it holds that
∂2Uk(s
∗)
∂sk∂sj
≤ 0
because s∗k > ck. Therefore, the relation
−
∑
j∈V
∂2Uk(s
∗)
∂sk∂sj
ds∗j
dR
=
∂2Uk(s
∗)
∂sk∂R
> 0
implies that there is at least one j such that
ds∗j
dR > 0.
(P5) It holds that
(|Va| − 1)(G− c¯)
R+G− c¯ +
R
∑
i∈V\Va ci
(R+G− c¯)2 + 1
≤
∑
i∈V
∂hi(G)
∂G
≤ (N − 1)(G− c¯)
R+G− c¯ + 1 (14)
where the lower bound can be found from (10) and the upper
bound can be obtained from (9):∑
i∈V
∂hi(G)
∂G
≤ − R(N − 1)
R+G− c¯ +N =
(N − 1)(G− c¯)
R+G− c¯ + 1.
If i ∈ V¯a, then i ∈ Va because it holds that s∗i ≥
ci +
(G+R−c¯)2
R
(
R
R+G−c¯ +
∂hi(G)
∂G − 1
) ≥ ci + R( RR+GU−c¯ +
∂hi(G
U )
∂G −1
)
by inequality (13). Given c¯ ≤ G∗, inequality (14)
implies that G¯ ≤ G ≤ G because H is a strictly decreasing
function. It holds that G ≤ G∗ because G∗ = H−1(1) and
H−1 is also strictly decreasing. Since
∑
i∈V hi(G) − G is
strictly increasing in G ∈ [0, G∗] and has a maximum at
G = G∗, we have∑
i∈V
hi(G¯)− G¯ ≤
∑
i∈V
Ui(s
∗) ≤
∑
i∈V
hi(G)−G. (15)
Dividing
max
s∈S
∑
i∈V
Ui(s) = max
s∈S
∑
i∈V
hi(s¯−R)− (s¯−R)
=
∑
i∈V
hi(G
∗)−G∗
by (15) yields the desired result. Now we proceed to
prove that PoA > 1 with any R < ∞ if c = 0,
but limR→∞ PoA(R, 0) = 1. It can be shown that G =
H−1( (|V¯a|−1)G¯
R+GU−c¯ + 1) < H
−1(1) = G∗ where G¯ 6= 0.
Therefore, 1 <
∑
i∈V hi(G
∗)−G∗∑
i∈V hi(G)−G ≤ PoA with any R <
∞. Moreover, as R → ∞, it holds that limR→∞ G¯ =
limR→∞G = H−1(1) = G∗. Therefore, we can conclude that
limR→∞ PoA = 1 if c¯ ≤ G∗. The properties with c¯ > G∗ can
be proven similarly. We omit its details.
A pair (R, c) = (G∗, G∗) satisfies G(R, c) + R − c¯ =
G(R, c) ≥ 0 and, by (P3), it holds that G(R, c) = G∗.
Therefore, there always exists at least one pair (R, c) such that
G(R, c) = G∗ if the convex constraint g(s∗(R, c), R) ≤ 0 is
absent. (P3) shows that payoff (4) does not have discontinuity
because s¯∗(R, c) > c¯. Remind that PoA(R, c) = 1 if and
only if G(R, c) = G∗. So (P5) indicates that it is impossible
to achieve optimality G(R, c) = G∗ with a finite reward
when perturbations are not allowed; i.e., there is no finite
maximizer of problem (2). Price of anarchy is identical to
Price of stability [1] which represents the ratio between the
socially optimal payoff and the aggregate payoff induced by
the best Nash equilibrium because there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium by (P1).
Some properties of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 reduce to those
in [41] where perturbations are absent. In particular, (P1) re-
duces to Proposition 2 of [41] where an unperturbed lottery has
a unique Nash equilibrium. (P5) is consistent with Theorem
2 in [41]; i.e., given any  > 0, there exists R such that
PoA(R, 0) ≤ 1 + . The lower and upper bounds of price
of anarchy are newly derived in this paper and they can be
calculated without finding the Nash equilibrium. Additionally,
(P3), and (P4) are new and reveal the properties regarding
public goods and investment, respectively.
V. CONVEX APPROXIMATION OF HIGH-LEVEL SOCIAL
OPTIMUM
Problem (6) is a bi-level optimization problem. In general,
this class of problems is computationally challenging. In
particular, papers [4], [25], [58] show that bi-level linear
programs are NP-hard. Given the computational hardness,
certain relaxations of problem (6) are needed in order to
find computationally efficient solvers. We will leverage The-
orem 4.2 to show that the following problem is a convex
7reformulation for problem (6). We will also show that, under
certain mild conditions, the approximation gap is zero.
min
(R,c)∈R×C
R+ αG∗
s.t. c¯ = G∗,
g(c1 +R
∂h1(G
∗)
∂G
, · · · , cN +R∂hN (G
∗)
∂G
,R) ≤ 0. (16)
The problem (16) is convex. The objective function is affine,
constraint c¯ = G∗ is also affine. Constraint
g(c1 +R
∂h1(G
∗)
∂G
, · · · , cN +R∂hN (G
∗)
∂G
,R) ≤ 0 (17)
is convex because a composition of convex function with affine
functions preserves convexity where g is a convex function
by Assumption 2.2 and ci + R
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G is an affine function.
Feasible setR×C is convex becauseR = (0,∞), Ci = [0, G∗]
are convex sets and Cartesian products preserve convexity.
The following theorem shows that problem (16) is a convex
reformulation of problem (6) if there exists a pair (R, c) such
that G(R, c) = G∗.
Sets F(6), and F(16) denote the feasible sets of problems (6),
and (16) respectively. Likewise, we define p∗(6), and p
∗
(16) as the
optimal values of problems (6), and (16) respectively.
Theorem 5.1: Assume that there is (R, c) ∈ F(5) such that
G(R, c) = G∗. Under Assumptions 2.1, and 2.2, it holds that
F(16) = F(6) and p∗(16) = p∗(6).
Proof: Notice that there is (R, c) ∈ F(5) such that
G(R, c) = G∗, and this implies that we can only focus on
a feasible set with constraint G + R ≥ c¯ according to (P2);
i.e., all the analysis in Section IV is valid. In the proof, we
will drop the dependency of G, s∗, and Ui on R and c. The
proofs are divided into two claim statements.
CLAIM 1. F(16) is a subset of F(6).
Proof: Assume that F(16) is non-empty and we pick any
(R, c) ∈ F(16). We will show that such the pair (R, c) satisfies
all the constraints in (6); i.e., (R, c) ∈ F(6).
The constraint c¯ = G∗ implies that G∗ = c¯ = G
by (P3). Therefore, it holds that G = G∗ which implies
(R, c) ∈ arg max∑i∈V Ui(s∗(R, c), R, c) in (6).
Using s¯∗ −R = G∗ = c¯, the first order condition yields
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
= R
s¯∗ − c¯− (s∗i − ci)
(s¯∗ − c¯)2 +
∂hi(s¯
∗ −R)
∂G
− 1
= −s
∗
i − ci
R
+
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G
≤ 0. (18)
This inequality implies that
s∗i ≥ ci +R
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G
> 0 (19)
because G∗ > 0 and R > 0. Since the players are active,
equality holds in the first order condition (18) as well as (19):
s∗i = ci +R
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G
. (20)
Therefore, constraint (17) implies
g(s∗, R) ≤ 0. (21)
Therefore, (R, c) ∈ F(6). The statement holds because we pick
arbitrary (R, c) ∈ F(16).
CLAIM 1 shows that F(16) ⊆ F(6). The objective function
of (16) is min(R,c)R + αG∗ = min(R,c)R + αc¯. Therefore,
solution p∗(16) is an overestimate of p
∗
(6). We now proceed to
prove that F(6) ⊆ F(16) and thus p∗(6) = p∗(16).
CLAIM 2. F(6) is a subset of F(16).
Proof: Assume that F(6) is non-empty and we pick any
(R, c) ∈ F(6). We will show that the pair satisfies all the
constraints in (16).
Recall that we assume that there exist (R, c) such that G =
G∗, and all the other constraints are satisfied. We now prove
c¯ = G∗ by contradiction. Assume that there exist pair (R, c)
such that G = G∗ but c¯ 6= G∗. By (14),
(|Va| − 1)(G∗ − c¯)
R+G∗ − c¯ + 1 +
R
∑
i∈V\Va ci
(R+G∗ − c¯)2 ≤
∑
i∈V
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G
,
which holds only if G∗ < c¯ ≤ R + G∗ or |Va| = 1. Let us
consider the first case. From (9), we have∑
i∈V
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
=
R(N − 1)
R+G∗ − c¯ +
∑
i∈V
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G
−N ≤ 0
which holds only if c¯ ≤ G∗, a contradiction. Therefore, it must
hold that |Va| = 1. First order condition (7) for i ∈ Va must
hold with equality. However, we have
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
= −R c¯− ci
(G∗ +R− c¯)2 +
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G
− 1
≤
∑
j∈V\i
∂hj(G
∗)
∂G
< 0
which contradicts to the first order condition, where∑
i∈V
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G = 1 is applied. Therefore, c¯ = G
∗. Note that if
c¯ = G∗, then G = G∗ by (P3).
First order condition with c¯ = G∗
∂Ui(s
∗)
∂si
= −s
∗
i
R
+
ci
R
+
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G
≤ 0
implies s∗i > 0, which holds for ∀i ∈ V; i.e., |Va| = N .
Using the first order condition (19), we can derive
s∗i = ci +R
∂hi(G
∗)
∂G
(22)
where equality holds because all the players are active. By
plugging (22) into constraint (21), we obtain (17). Therefore,
(R, c) ∈ F(16). The statement holds because we pick arbitrary
(R, c) ∈ F(6).
CLAIM 1 and CLAIM 2 imply that F(6) = F(16). The objec-
tive functions are equivalent to each other because c¯ = G∗ for
the both feasible sets. Thus it holds that p∗(6) = p
∗
(16).
In Theorem 5.1, non-convex optimization problem (6) is ap-
proximated by (or equivalent to) a convex optimization prob-
lem (16), which can be efficiently solved [9]. In particular, with
c¯ = G∗, we could obtain a constant public good G(R, c) = G∗
by (P3) in Theorem 4.2, which sequentially results in the
replacement of potentially non-concave function s∗i (R, c) with
a linear function (20). We show that this condition is a
sufficient and necessary condition for the social optimum.
Remark 5.1: The optimal bi-level lottery design may not
guarantee individual rationality; i.e., Ui(s∗, R, c) ≥ 0. How-
ever, as long as there exists (R, c) such that G(R, c) = G∗,
8individual rationality can be readily ensured by adding the
convex constraints g as follows:
gi(s
∗(R, c), R) = −(s∗i − ci +Rhi(G∗)−Rs∗i ) ≤ 0
for ∀i ∈ V where hi(G∗) is a constant. By applying G∗ = c¯
into Ui(s∗, R, c) ≥ 0 in (4), one can show that the above
condition is equivalent to Ui(s∗, R, c) ≥ 0 for ∀i ∈ V .
VI. CASE STUDY
In this section, we will apply our perturbed lottery to
demand response in the smart grid. Demand response involves
a load serving entity (LSE) and a set of end-users. The LSE
is the social planner and wants to incentivize the end-users to
shift their peak-time demand to off-peak time. The end-users
participate the lottery by shifting a portion of their shiftable
demands.
Consider a power transmission network described by (G, E)
where G and E denote the set of buses and the set of
transmission lines, respectively. In particular, V ⊆ G, and
P ⊆ G denote the set of load buses with non-zero demand
(end-users), and the set of generator buses, respectively. Each
line l ∈ E has power flow capacity fmaxl ∈ R≥0 and
fmax = [fmax1 , · · · , fmax|E| ]T .
With the perturbed lottery, each end-user has payoff func-
tion (4) where decision variable si denotes shifted demand in
monetary value. Function hi represents any impetus from the
public good; e.g., inverse of stability concern, utility discount,
additional rewards made by the LSE. The LSE solves prob-
lem (6), in which convex constraints g represent three physical
constraints; i.e., the end-users cannot shift more than the
demand, and the total adjusted demand after shifting cannot
exceed the total power generation, and the line capacities are
enforced:
L− s∗ ≥ 0,
∑
i∈V
(Li − s∗i ) ≤
∑
j∈P
Pj ,
− fmax ≤ HpP −Hl(L− s∗) ≤ fmax (23)
where L ∈ R|V|≥0 and P ∈ R|P|≥0 denote power demand and
power generation, respectively. Matrix H ∈ [−1, 1]|E|×|G| is
the injection shift factor matrix where (a, b) entry of H repre-
sents the active power change on line a with respect to change
in power injection at bus b. Matrices Hl ∈ [−1, 1]|E|×|V| and
Hp ∈ [−1, 1]|E|×|P| are the collections of columns i ∈ V and
i ∈ P of H , respectively. Since L, P , fmax are constants at
the given time, constraints (23) are convex and thus satisfy
Assumption 2.2.
We conduct case studies using IEEE 30-bus test system
shown in Figure 1 where |P| = 6, |V| = 20, and |E| = 41.
The system parameters are obtained from MATPOWER [61].
Money/power exchange rate $0.1/kWh is applied and 1
hour time frame is considered; e.g., the generator at bus
1 generates 23.54MW × 1h × $0.1/kWh = $2354. We
intentionally increase the power demand of each load bus
by 30% without changing power generations, so that demand
shifts are inevitable.
We choose hi(s¯ − R) = (100 + i) log(s¯ − R + 1) for bus
i ∈ V; e.g., bus 30 ∈ V has h30(s¯−R) = 130 log(s¯−R+ 1).
Fig. 1: IEEE 30-bus test system [12].
One can see that function hi satisfies Assumption 2.1. The
logarithmic model of provision of public good hi is based on
Cobb-Douglas utility function [14]. Recent papers [37], [48],
[50] use such function to express the benefits from a public
good. We choose α = 1.
The socially optimal public good G∗ = $2317 of unper-
turbed lottery is calculated by (3). The socially optimal payoff
is obtained by
∑
i∈V hi(G
∗)−G∗ = $7142.
We solve problem (6) by CVX [19], and generate optimal
value $5675 with solution (R∗, c∗) presented in Figure 2. The
figure also presents the induced Nash equilibrium of the op-
timal lottery game. The aggregate payoff induces the socially
optimal public good s¯∗(R∗, c∗) − R∗ = $5675 − $3358 =
$2317 = G∗, and the socially optimal payoff
∑
i∈V hi(G
∗)−
G∗ = $15644. Convex program (16) generates a large reward
R∗ = $3358 to satisfy the physical constraints (23). Note
that c¯ = G∗ is a sufficient and necessary condition for the
optimality, according to Theorem 5.1. By Theorem 5.1, the
Fig. 2: Optimal solution c∗i with R
∗ = $3358 and the
corresponding Nash equilibrium s∗i .
9solution is identical to that of problem (6) and satisfies all
the physical constraints described in (23). Figure 3 visualizes
that the first constraint is satisfied where the shifted demand
never exceeds the power demand. The second constraint is
also satisfied because
∑
j∈P Pj =
∑
i∈V(Li − s∗i ) = $18921.
Figure 4 shows that power flow at each transmission line never
exceeds its capacity.
Fig. 3: Power demand and adjusted demand after shifting.
Fig. 4: Percentage of power flow used in each line.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study an optimal bi-level lottery design
problem where a social planner aims to achieve the social
optimum through least reward and perturbations. We approx-
imate the problem via a convex relaxation and identify mild
sufficient conditions under which the approximation is exact.
The results are verified via a case study on demand response
in the smart grid.
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